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DOES AN AUSTERE EUROPE HAVE A FUTURE? 
Michael O'Sullivan 
The Eurozone crisis is a profoundly structural one in that it has unmasked the inappropri-
ateness of the monetary union for certain member states and the complacency of its gov­
erning class. The aims and raison d'être of the European project must now be rethought 
in an original way and communicated in a clear way to its bewildered citizens. It needs 
new and reformed institutions, and above ail it needs leaders. Specifically, in the econom-
ic arena, policymakers need to broaden the range of policy options to actively consider 
debt restructurings and the exit of some countries from the Eurozone. 
It is hard to imagine a group of European leaders drafting a set of essays com-
parable to the Federalist Papers that would elaborate the structures and paths 
to lead the Union out of its economic crisis. Indeed, though it is difficult to i-
magine any set of politicians internationally matching the foresight of 
Hamilton, Jay and Madison, authors of the Federalist Papers, the comparison 
is valid and important. Europe (as understood by the Eurozone) is a young 
construct, imperfectly formed and enduring a difficult adolescence, not un-
like the fledgling US monetary system in the late 18th century. It requires 
structures, leadership and strategies in order to further develop, and the re-
sponse to the Eurozone crisis has shown all of these to be wonting. 
As the Eurozone crisis has deepened comparisons with the early years of 
the American republic have grown, partly because its leaders faced many of 
the same technical policy issues that now confront Europe such as the need 
for common "federal" bonds, and because the admirable qualities exhibited 
by the likes of Alexander Hamilton are so notably absent on the European 
stage today. Indeed, several commentators have wondered aloud as to "what 
* Michael O'Sullivan is the author of Ireland and the Global Question (Cork University 
Press) and What did we do Right? (Blackhall Publishing). He is an independent member of 
Ireland's National Economic Social Council (NESC). 
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Hamilton would do?" if confronted by our crisis.1 He was original, independ-
ent, a leader and an institution builder par excellence. The solution to 
Europe's crisis lies in the substance of these virtues. 
It also lies in a broader re-imagination of the future of Europe. Specifically, 
the aims and raison d'être of the European project must be rethought in an o-
riginal way and communicated in a clear way to its bewildered citizens. It 
must be re-conceived in way that is as independent as possible from interest 
groups, political careers of individual national politicians and groupthink of 
the Brussels establishment. It needs new and reformed institutions, and above 
all it needs leaders. The danger of course, is that in order to compel leaders to 
enter the debate, the crisis must deepen, economically and politically. 
To date, the remedies applied to cure the periphery countries of their eco-
nomic ills have been tardy and short-sighted. For some time it seemed as if 
this was a crisis without an end, without a solution.2 Despite the introduction 
of the fiscal compact3 and the establishment of policy building sites in the 
form of the ESM (European Stability Mechanism) and the EFSF (European 
Financial Stability Facility), there has been no authentic attempt to trace the 
source of the Eurozone crisis to the underlying structures of the single-curren-
cy, the EU Constitution and the workings of the Commission. The reality is 
that the Constitution is unwieldy, the single-currency framework is half-baked 
and the periphery countries are being crushed by its shortcomings. The aus-
terity ointment that has been applied to save them only weakens them, and in 
Hippocrates' eyes would violate the principle of "do no harm". 
This essay highlights how in the context of complacent and badly coordinat-
ed policy making at the heart of Europe, an intellectually misplaced and politi-
cally misguided policy of austerity has been put in place to solve the Eurozone 
crisis. It argues that a more realistic and possibly dramatic approach of debt 
restructuring (incorporating the exit of one or more countries) and a more 
pro-growth outlook would have a more positive effect. The essay also aims to 
1. R.C. Henning - M. Kessler, "Fiscal federalism: US history for architects of Europe's fiscal 
union", Breugel Essay and Lecture Series, 10 January 2012; R. McKinnon, "Oh for an Ale-
xander Hamilton to save Europe", Financial Times, 18 December 2011. 
2. The Vix index of market volatility stayed above its long-term average level for 5 months, 
nearly as long as the post Lehman failure period and as long as during the Asian crisis. 
3. The Fiscal Stability Treaty is an intergovernmental treaty which was signed by all of the 
member states of the European Union (EU) March 2012, with the exception of the UK and 
Czech Republic. Ireland held a referendum on the Treaty on May 31st. 
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draw attention to the underlying inadequacy of the Eurozone monetary sys-
tem and sketches the very demanding program of institutional rebuilding that 
is required for the Eurozone to survive. The need for a focus on the architec-
ture of the monetary zone has until very recently lacked an urgent place in the 
political debate, and until this structural issue is addressed, this crisis will con-
tinue. Finally, to take a broader, more political and philosophical tack, the es-
say picks up the much broader theme of "what Europe should stand for?" 
1. THE COMPLACENT CONTINENT 
The policy response to the crisis has also been startlingly inward looking. 
While there appears to be relatively little appreciation of how small businesses 
in places as diverse as Cork, Valencia, Volos and Porto have suffered, there is 
also apparently little intellectual effort to tie Europe's crisis to the state and 
evolution of the world economy. Beyond politically convenient attacks on 
banks, there was no obvious attempt to question the validity of austerity in 
Europe when output gaps in significant neighbouring economies (i.e. the US 
and UK) are large and where growth is fragile. Neither is there an attempt to 
locate some of the necessary structural reforms in the light of the competitive 
threat to Europe from Asia and other emerging countries. This strategic 
"blind spot" betrays both complacency and an encroaching irrelevance. 
There is a vivid debate in the US on the possibility that Americas hegemon 
becomes impaired or that more bluntly Americas empire falls. The very exis-
tence of such a cottage industry of concerned commentators4 is perhaps one 
indication that American public life is not complacent in the same way that 
Europe appears to be. Europe it seems is happy to exit the fast lane and fash-
ion itself as the "chocolate producing region" of the world to re-animate Alan 
Mine's caricature,5 a region where "strategic yogurt policy" trumps many other 
concerns. 
If evidence of the shambling approach of Brussels is required, its response 
to the Arab Spring is proof. There was first of all very little appreciation by 
European policy making elites of the effect that high food prices, lack of eco-
nomic openness and dysfunction of the rule of law, coupled with high unem-
ployment were having across North Africa. In fact, several European politi-
4. Robert Kagan and John Ilkenberry are some of the leading lights here. 
5. A. Mine, "Ce monde qui vient", Grasset, Paris 2004. 
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cians,6 institutions and companies enjoyed close personal and political ties with 
the regions tyrants. Once the Arab Spring was underway, the political response 
from Europe remained cautious and when military assistance was required 
(i.e. Libya) the reaction was slow and disjointed. Given that the Spring is ar-
guably the most significant political event to occur on the borders of Europe 
since the Yugoslav conflict or even the fall of communism, it is disappointing 
that Europe has no plan to revive and rebuild the Spring economies, nor that 
a muddle of national responses has drowned out a coherent federal approach. 
In riposte, supporters of the status quo in Brussels point to the effectiveness 
of the Union in spreading peace and goodwill across Europe itself. While that 
is a good base from which to build it is a view that misses the many social and 
political problems that will manifest themselves as a result of the Eurozone 
crisis. Further, this is not a perspective that captures the distrust and disen-
chantment that Europe's citizens now have in the project and its leaders, nor 
does it capture the growing distrust between individual governments, and be-
tween some of the institutions that make up the Union. Eurobarometer7 polls 
show this to good effect -the autumn 2011 Standard Survey showed trust in 
the EU (34%) at its lowest level since 2004, having declined precipitously s-
ince the onset of the Eurozone crisis. On average, trust by Europeans in their 
respective national parliaments and governments is even lower (27% and 
24% respectively). 
In short, the political effect of the crisis means that deeper union is unlikely 
to occur by happy consensus and collaboration, and may only come about by 
coercion. There are echoes of Keynes' "The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace" here, where the harshness of the "peace" or bailouts imposed on Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal sows further economic woes and the seeds of discontent. 
In order that further "compression" and deeper economic pain are avoid-
ed, Europe's leaders must re-evaluate the entire European project, its aims and 
goals. These are no longer clear to the European public and neither are they 
robust, having failed at this first test. If they do not do so the project will be 
further undermined by the splintering around its edges that that may finally 
produce deeper ruptures. Poor governance in and of Greece was one such s-
plintering, and cheap money transformed this into a full blown fissure. 
If not addressed at a deep and conceptual level the cracks underlying 
6. Such as the resignation of Michele Alliot Marie, former French Foreign Minister, over 
her contacts to the Tunisian regime. 
7. European Commission, Eurobarometer 76, December 2011. 
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Europe may produce a triplet of shocks not seen since the Great Depression. 
Then, three shocks -a financial market crisis born out of excessive leverage in 
1929, a monetary framework crisis in 1933 and a political crisis of protec­
tionism in 1930 with the introduction of the Tariff (Smooth Hawley) Act,8 
produced a collapse in the international economy. So far the template of the 
1930s remains relevant, with the Lehman Brothers period mirroring the 
Great Crash and the Eurozone crisis aping the breaking of the Gold Standard. 
The risk is that a third wave of protectionism (even competitive currency de­
valuations), economic nationalism or anti-globalisation takes hold to shrink 
world trade further. Indeed, the EU already has several contenders to play the 
role of Herbert Hoover. 
In the 1930s, Europe witnessed nasty and corrosive outbreaks of national­
ism and National Socialism followed from this.9 Nationalism and by exten­
sion protectionism are most usually provoked by economic downturns, espe­
cially when these are pronounced. The period of the Eurozone crisis has been 
marked by a number of colourful examples of this. High sales of Thilo 
Sarazins book Deutschland schaft sich ab, relentless, competitive counter-
stereotyping in the Greek and German media, and even the PUGS acronym 
are testament to the poison seeping from the pores of the euro-system. More 
recently, the popularity of more extreme candidates Jean-Luc Melanchon and 
Marianne Le Pen during the French Presidential campaign reflects the appeal 
of protectionism and an anti-immigrant sentiment. Moreover, during April 
2012, in the Netherlands, the actions of Geert Wilder s Freedom Party led to 
the collapse of the government. 
2. T H E AUSTERITY VORTEX 
A central element in the growing divisiveness at the heart of Europe is the 
policy of austerity. It has been readily adopted as the logical cure for the prob­
lems of Europe's peripheral countries in the mistaken belief that this would 
impress bond markets and cure the periphery of its financial prolificacy. 
8. This introduced tariffs of up to 60% on overseas goods. 
9. A. De Brom head - Β. Eichengreen - Κ. O'Rourke, "Right-wing political extremism in 
the Great Depression", VOXEU, 27 February 2012. An essay by Eric Koch-Weser on "Radical 
forces in Germany" in the April 1931 edition of Foreign AHkirs is also worth reading in this 
context. 
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Austerity has been assumed as a groupthink, over and above more daring, in-
cisive and arguably decisive measures such as early and full debt restructuring, 
exit of the Eurozone by one or more countries or a boost to the rate of 
growth in the Eurozone economy. 
2012 will be the fifth consecutive year of recession in Greece (assuming 
that as the World Bank claims the Greek recession started in 2008), putting it 
on track to have a "depression" akin to that suffered by the US between the 
years 1930 to 1939. The US economy shrank by nearly 30% during the Great 
Depression, and so far Greece has "only" done 16% (though a chaotic default 
or euro exit could easily leapfrog it into "Depression" territory). Latvia has in 
fact suffered a deeper shock, dropping by almost 25% from 2008 to 2010, 
though it now appears to be rebounding strongly. 
Austerity has acted like a quicksand in that the adoption of this policy 
across Europe compressed growth and further knocked the breath out of the 
smaller economies. In 2010 smaller countries with stronger economic engines 
like the Netherlands, Finland and Belgium managed to beat their deficit tar-
gets (as forecast by the European Commission) whereas weaker countries 
(Portugal and Greece) missed by over a full percentage point (in terms of d-
eficit % GDP). In 2011 however, as the austerity groupthink became more 
profound and Europe's recession deepened, only Germany and Ireland man-
aged to (barely) beat their deficit targets. At the same time, even the 
Netherlands and Belgium slipped from their tight fiscal moorings, while 
Spain and Greece missed their budget deficit targets by a full 2% each. Of the 
periphery countries, only Italy can be expected to flirt with the prospect of a 
balanced budget by 2014. 
The rationale for austerity, as conceived during the Eurozone crisis is 
Panglossian. Austerity is apparently the best possible way to salvage Europe 
from recession and through the fiscal compact to tether it to a policy of fiscal 
rectitude in better times. The theory goes that austerity provokes a sharp, 
short lived contraction but at the same time so burnishes the credibility of the 
"victim" country that capital pours into the economy from outside investors 
and private savings holders. 
A prominent, German (American) economist, Rudiger Dornbusch added 
to his reputation by introducing the notion of "expansionary fiscal contrac-
tion", notably the idea that a tightening of belts convinces savers of the seri-
ousness of the tightening country and the inflow of capital brings down debt 
rates which induces a boost to the economy. In practice, expansionary fiscal 
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contraction has worked for countries transitioning from a weak to a better set 
of institutions, or where policy waywardness is corrected in the context of 
more favourable international factors.10 
More realistic proponents of austerity recommend that it is best applied 
when it cuts fat rather the muscle of an economic system (such as when a 
budget adjustment takes the form of longer-term adjustments to pensions 
and wealth), or when its negative side-effects can be offset by a falling curren-
cy or easier monetary policy. 
Austerity as applied in Europe today runs into several problems.11 First, the 
offsetting factors mentioned above have been constrained and in most cases 
have worked to exacerbate the problem. The periphery countries are "locked" 
in the pressure cooker of the Eurozone, with little escape valve (i.e. interest 
rates, currency) available. 
Secondly, the Eurozone's neighbouring economies in the developed world 
are equally ensnared by indebtedness and suffering low growth. For instance, 
two of the more significant trading partners with the Eurozone, the UK and 
US, have large output gaps,12 and both have long-running, record low interest 
rate policies (in the UK rates are the lowest since 1994). 
In addition, the transmission mechanism of the global economy, the bank-
ing sector, is being forced by regulators to contract in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. The Eurozone crisis sped up the process of deleveraging such 
that banks did much less business and in specific countries such as Ireland, 
Greece and to an extent Spain, banking systems have been in a state of dys-
function. 
To labour the point a little, austerity has foolishly been administered to e-
conomies in a state of shock such that its ultimate effects have been self-de-
feating. In Spain and Ireland, the collapse of housing bubbles has contributed 
to a demand shock while in Portugal and to a much greater extent in Greece, 
there is a competitiveness or "reality" shock in that the relatively poor quality 
of their economic structures is now being uncovered. Continued doses of 
austerity administered under these conditions deepen risk aversion and fur-
io. J. Guajardo - D. Leigh - A. Pescatori, "Expansionary Austerity: New International 
Evidence", IMF Working Paper, July 2011. 
11. "These results cast doubt on at least some versions of the expansionary fiscal consolida-
tion hypothesis, and on its applicability to many countries in the present circumstances". R. 
Perrotti, "The 'Austerity Myth', Gain Without Pain?", NBER Working Paper Series, 2011. 
12. http://stats.oecd.org/mei/default.asp?rev=2&lang=e 
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ther damage the confidence of households, so setting in train a downward, 
self-reinforcing spiral (negative feedback loop) in activity, sentiment and 
funding. To make matters worse, the cross-fire of several policy errors from s-
tatements at the Deauville summit in October 2010 to the soap operatic na-
ture of subsequent summits have very simply exacerbated the dearth of confi-
dence that markets have in policy makers. 
In this area the discussion of what is known as the "multiplier" is very impor-
tant. This refers to the sensitivity of a country's economic activity to changes 
in spending for example. When the multiplier is low, a large cut in spending 
has a proportionately smaller effect on growth. What is not quite clear is 
whether under conditions of stress and risk aversion, small cuts in spending 
can cause a large retrenchment in household activity as people seek to build 
up precautionary savings,13 and even more activity to the black economy. 
A final objection relates to economic structure. The rationale of austerity as 
it applies from German economic orthodoxy14 is that a dose of austerity ulti-
mately makes you fitter and stronger. This holds provided that the austerity is 
not administered under conditions of chaos, very importantly if the underly-
ing economic engine is relatively strong and where the public have inter-
nalised the importance of austerity owing to their economic history (i.e. hy-
perinflation in the German case). Again, the trouble here is that when indus-
trial structure is considered, Greece, Portugal, and Spain are relatively weak 
when compared to more advanced and export led economies of the 
Netherlands,15 Germany and even Ireland. For instance, trade to GDP ratios 
for Ireland and the Netherlands are nearly three times those of Portugal and 
Greece. The point here is that industrial structure in the weaker Eurozone 
countries is weak by comparison to that of Germany so that under the 
German led logic of austerity, the effect is to injure the periphery economies 
rather than make them more fit. 
In summary then, austerity as an economic tonic works best when the 
13. There is in fact growing evidence that the fiscal multiplier varies over the business cycle, 
in that it is large during periods of contraction and smaller during expansion. See P. 
Michaillant, "Fiscal multipliers over the business cycle", CEPR Discussion paper, No 112, 
January 2012. Also A. Auerbach - Y. Gorodnichenko, "Measuring the Output Responses to 
Fiscal Policy" NBER Working Paper No. 16311, August 2010. 
14. S. Dullien - U. Guerot, "The long shadow of Ordoliberalism: Germany's approach to 
the Euro crisis", European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, February 2012. 
15. Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands are the top three most globalised countries in the 
world KOF Globalisation Index, http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. 
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country administering it has its own currency and interest rates, when neigh-
bouring economies are relatively healthy and where a credibility gap can be 
closed by some stringent policy making. Ireland in the late 1980's is a good 
example. Austerity does not work when applied over the course of four or 
more years to countries that do not have sovereignty over monetary policy, 
that endure broken banking systems, whose households are in the grip of a se-
vere economic shock, whose neighbouring economies are weak and who still 
suffer the side-effects of an adolescent economic structure. Ireland, Spain, 
Greece, Portugal and possibly even France are examples. 
The economic rationale for austerity seems misplaced in the circumstances 
of the smaller Eurozone countries and in the context of a downturn in eco-
nomic activity. There is also a disturbing subtext to austerity which is that at 
times its rationale has been to punish the wayward members of the Eurozone. 
In the same way in which short-selling bans were triumphandy heralded as the 
solution to the banking crisis, and the transaction tax on financial market ac-
tivity is seen as a coherent part of the solution to the Eurozone crisis, austerity 
is associated with a perceived moral16 element in terms of bringing southern 
countries to heel. 
The psychological or behavioural appeal of austerity as a mantra is that 
morally it appeals at a very basic level, however damaging this may prove. It is 
also convenient for the way in which it gathers into a groupthink, and helps 
to shroud judgement of the underlying fault-lines in the Eurozone monetary 
system. The logic here is that the system cannot be wrong, it's that some 
members are simply too weak and need a diet of rigorous austerity. 
At the same time, some countries have benefitted from the side effects of 
austerity. Germany's political power in Europe has gained from its relative fi-
nancial strength and has granted it a guiding hand in shaping the bailout 
packages for the periphery states.17 In economic terms, Germany, its unions 
and industrial leaders deserve great credit for the way in which they have re-
formed its labour market in the mid 2000's and for the discipline with which 
real labour costs have been controlled. Germany's wage restraint and the pro-
ductivity gains that have been achieved are a model for countries like France 
to follow. However, in a similar manner to how countries like Ireland enjoyed 
16. P. De Grauwe, "The Euro-zone as a morality play", Intereconomics, Vol. 46, No. 5 
Septem ber /October 2011. 
17. Details of some countries' budget plans were leaked from the German parliament, be-
fore the sovereign parliament members had seen them. Financial Times, 18 November 2011. 
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highly stimulative low real interest rates, the effect of the (weaker) common 
currency has been to super charge German industry, especially its exporters. 
The effect of the single currency has been to grant Germany a currency 
that may well have been weaker than the original Deutschmark would have 
been. This was most likely the case during periods of intense financial market 
stress in early 2009, mid-2010 and late 2011. In addition, from a competitive 
point of view by cutting off the avenue for currency devaluation to the likes 
of Spain and Italy, the Eurozone structure has curbed their ability to out-com-
pete German exports through currency depreciation. Further, the offshoot of 
the financial contagion from the likes of Greece and Italy compressed 
German bund yields to their lowest levels in decades, again below where fun-
damentals would suggest they trade.18 
In this respect, and setting aside the contractionary effects on the banking 
sector (though German banks have largely seen deposit inflows) from finan-
cial market stress and regulatory headwinds, the German economy became 
the inadvertent beneficiary of other countries' economic pain. To a degree, 
other "true sovereigns" around the periphery have benefitted from the travails 
of the Eurozone in terms of enjoying low bond yields. Switzerland, Sweden 
and the UK all saw long term interest rates fall to historically low levels, 
though the inflow of capital to "safe" Switzerland produced its own dilemma 
with the Swiss franc pushing close to parity with the euro by August 2011 
(from rate of 1.40 twelve months previously). 
The case of the "old sovereigns" (developed countries with well-established 
institutions, free floating currencies and independent central banks) helps to 
eke out the shortcomings of the euro-system. Some of them, notably the UK 
and the US have debt to equity ratios that are higher than those of many 
Eurozone countries (though at the same time have lower interest rates). 
Indeed, it appeared to surprise Eurozone politicians that at the end of 2011, 
according to IMF figures, the US had a gross government debt to GDP ratio 
of 100%, the Eurozone a ratio of 87%, with the UK close by at 83%. 
Moreover, the US also suffered a downgrade in the summer of 2011. Still, US 
Treasury bonds and UK gilts rallied strongly as the Eurozone bond market was 
torn apart. Both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have engaged 
18. At the end of March Der Spiegel reported that Germany could save EUR 30bn in inter-
est payments on its debt because of abnormally low interest rates. In September 2011, the 10 
year bund yield dropped below 1.7%, its lowest level in over thirty years. Since then bund 
yields have ominously dropped below those of Japan falling to 1.4% in May 2012. 
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in quantitative easing, something that the ECB has only done in a very round-
about way at the end of 2011. In the US, austerity has been circumvented (the 
Super Committee failed in November 2011 to agree a plan to reduce the US 
budget deficit)19 and the economy is now undergoing a moderately healthy 
recovery, while in the UK austerity measures are curbing growth, though they 
have not destabilised gilts and sterling. 
3. INCOMPLETE AND INAPPROPRIATE 
The essence of the argument here is that countries like the UK are free to mo-
bilise the full range of policy tools in support of their economy, and notwith-
standing the ebb and flow of the economies of their trade partners, they are 
intellectually independent in the sense of being able to decide the course of 
action to return to economic health. The same cannot be said for France and 
Italy, two economies of similar size to the UK, with similar economic funda-
mentals. For them, the Eurozone as a monetary system is either incomplete 
or inappropriate. This is even more the case for the smaller countries whose 
economies are being pushed and squeezed by the common monetary system. 
Ireland is a case in point. Its boom years were partly fed by inappropriately 
low interest rates from Frankfurt, coupled with poor policy making and the 
absence of strong regulation in Dublin. No correcting mechanism was put in 
place to take account of the fact that monetary policy set in Frankfurt could 
at times be too hot or too cold for one of the smaller economies of the 
Eurozone. In this case, what a country like Ireland requires is clever and flexi-
ble use of fiscal policy to offset common monetary policy. A fiscal compact 
will do the opposite and will tie both policy making hands behind the backs 
of smaller nations. 
As the crucible for so many economic "experiments" Ireland should have 
plenty to offer the debate on the future structure of the Eurozone and it 
should fight hard so that the lessons of its bubble are incorporated in the e-
volving structures of the EU. In this spirit, attention must be drawn to the un-
derlying flaws of the Eurozone system and its inappropriateness for all but a 
few of the core economies. It will either consume the weaker members and 
render itself asunder, or, more constructively its members can embark on an 
19. www.deficitreduction.gov 
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institutional project of Hamiltonian proportions to rebuild and redevelop the 
monetary system. 
4. EUROPE'S HAMILTON PROJECT 
Europe needs to complete the building of its financial architecture, to take ac-
count of the deficiencies of the current Eurozone system, and more impor-
tantly to equip it for the 21st century, where competiveness relative to Asia 
will become a major issue, and where the effects of demographics and low 
growth will place even more pressure on the common currency 
In terms of the building project that needs to be embarked upon, perhaps 
the most neglected is a viable and credible exit mechanism for weak or recal-
citrant states. It is arguably the case that if Greece had left the union in 2010, 
the contagion to other countries may have been lessened. Much depends on 
the manner with which "ejection" or "rejection" occurs, and in particular on 
the extent to which legal groundwork has been prepared for a possible rup-
ture, in sense of contract law, eligibility of currencies, bank reserves and cor-
porate activity. A stabilisation package may be needed to cushion the blow of 
an exit. 
Calls for a Greek exit have grown of late, and as pain levels rose even sen-
ior European politicians pondered this publicly. The standard response was 
that in order to leave the euro, Greece would have to leave the Union itself. 
There is a policy gap here20 that must prepare the ground for an exit process 
that is as least disorderly as possible. In addition, there should be a sense of n-
ear permanence over "exit". The Eurozone, for the sake of credibility should 
not be something into which there is a revolving door policy. In addition, the 
existence of a "trap-door" in the euro mechanism may reduce the moral haz-
ard problem that has worried policy makers in that it serves to discipline 
Eurozone member states with the prospect of relegation. 
The reality of an "exit" implies that a country does not have the institu-
tional quality and industrial strength to play a part in the economic life of the 
Union and achieving a turnaround in these factors will simply take decades. 
While Greece and Portugal where industrial structure and "rule of law" lag 
behind the EU average are the prominent candidates for exclusion, the estab-
20. It seems that only euro-sceptics such as those awarding and competing for the Wolfson 
Prize are willing to consider in detail the prospect of an exit for a Eurozone country. 
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lishment of an exit process is also most relevant for Eastern European states 
such as Estonia, Slovenia and to a lesser extent Slovakia, as well as the "aspir­
ing" nations from Poland to Romania to the Czech Republic. 
The existence of an exit mechanism and the lessons of the Eurozone crisis 
may likely curb the desire of the "new periphery" to join the single currency 
and should temper the willingness of Brussels to allow them in. In terms of 
policy, it most likely means that the "new periphery" countries need another 
wave of institution building, tightening adherence to the rule of law (especial­
ly in the likes of Bulgaria and Romania) and building up expertise in econom­
ic management. 
While the "new periphery" needs to undergo a step change in terms of in­
stitutional quality so that its economies are more robust and on more of a par 
with those at the centre of the Eurozone, the centre also needs to change in 
terms of institutional quality. Of the many deficiencies brought to light by the 
crisis, poor coordination21 and lack of financial market expertise are two very 
prominent ones. They highlight the need for a "super- finance" ministry at 
the heart of Brussels that is superior in terms of expertise, power and reach 
than the current incarnation. It should be the equivalent in stature to the US 
Treasury, and as well, if not better equipped in terms of human capital.22 
Indeed, the Eurozone crisis exposed Brussels' limited grasp of the effects and 
workings of the financial markets, as they pertained to economic policy. 
The Euro Treasury will perform several functions -first to guide the 
process of institutional reform in Eurozone countries in much the same way 
in which the OECD provides policy advice, but with a "bigger stick". 
Importantly, the Euro-Treasury must act as the nexus between financial mar­
kets, national economies and the trade flows associated with globalisation. 
Managing and offsetting financial market crisis is one of the most important 
factors in the survival of new nations and young economies,23 and it should 
not be different in the case of a fledgling currency zone. As crisis management 
has been one of the weaknesses of the Commission, it now needs to be im­
proved dramatically so that the side-effects of emergencies (a weakened and 
21. A good exposition on this comes from Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi http://www.ecb.int/press/ 
key/date/2011/html/spl 10708.en.html 
22. "US Treasury: Manhattan Transfer", Financial Times, 5 February 2012. 
23. For example, A. Foxley, "Lessons from Chile's Development in the 1990s" in Τ Besley 
- R. Zagha, (eds.), Development Challenges in the 1990's, Leading Policymakers speak from 
experience, Oxford University Press and World Bank, Washington DC. 2005. 
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disorderly Russian economy, a Chinese recession, a soft commodity price 
bubble and protectionism) can be managed. 
One of the projects that a Euro-Treasury must oversee is the inevitable (if 
the Eurozone is to evolve) creation of a deep Eurozone bond market where 
common bond are issued across all Eurozone countries, and potentially where 
if "extra" debt needs to be issued this is done by individual countries at a pre-
mium/discount to "Eurobonds" along the lines of the blue/red bonds idea24 
proposed by von Weizacker and Depla. The passage towards a Eurobond will 
in all reality only occur when most Eurozone countries have managed to cut 
debt levels, either by selling state assets, growing and inflating their economies 
or by restructuring their debt. 
It may be too late however by the time debt levels have fallen to acceptable 
levels, and in certain respects policymakers may by then be fighting yesterday's 
crisis. One means to speeding the passage towards a euro-bond issue may be 
for indebted states to offer collateral in respect of "excess" debt. 
A further prominent role for a European "Treasury" is the structuring and 
collection of a Eurozone wide tax, for the purposes of supporting a Eurozone 
capital fund, a crisis and business cycle stabilisation fund and in certain re-
spects a strategic investment fund.25 Other tax streams may also flow along 
similar lines, such as a pan-European defence tax whose receipts could be spent 
on pan-national assets such as heavy lifting aircraft, internet defence systems 
and measures to protect against international organised crime and terrorism. 
5. WHY IS GROWTH IMPORTANT? 
In the context of Europe's dominance of the league tables of human develop-
ment, culture and its high absolute and relative levels of wealth and income it 
may seem out of place to stress the need for an overhaul of Europe's economic 
24. Several proposals on such a structure have been put forward: W. Boonstra, "Towards a 
better Stability Pact", Intereconomics, Vol. 40, No. 1, January/February 2005, pp. 4-9; P. De 
Grauwe, W Moesen, "Gains for all: a proposal for a common euro bond", CEPS Com-
mentaries, 3 April 2009; S. Eijffinger, "Eurobonds-Concepts and Implications", Briefing: Note 
to tAe European Parliament, March 2011. The more attractive is presented in J. Delpla - J. von 
Weizsäcker, "The Blue Bond Proposal", Bmegel Policy Brief 2010/03, May 2012. 
25. This may be structured like a sovereign wealth fund though its aim is to act as a buffer 
on markets, especially in the case of excess and deficit of liquidity. 
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institutions and the creation of mightier ones, notwithstanding the Eurozone 
crisis. The fact however, is that, compared to the United States and more par-
ticularly the various poles of the emerging world, Europe's influence will 
wane, more quickly so if it remains as disorganised and economically disunited 
as it currently is. In this respect, another part of the geo-strategic equation is the 
need to internalise growth and real competitiveness in the minds of European 
politicians, with a focus on those operating in Brussels and Frankfurt. 
A quick track through time, by virtue of the late Angus Maddison's econom-
ics database26 and then with a little help from IMF forecasts helps to make this 
clearer. In 1820, China accounted for 32% of world GDP with 30 European 
countries combining to account for only 23%. The US was a minnow then, 
with an absolute level of GDP at only twice that of Ireland and 1.7% of the 
world total. By 1870 the US had shot to nearly 9% of world GDP, Europe 
was dominant at 33% and China had slipped back to 17%. Fast forward to 
2030 where if we assume a long-run growth rate of 55 for China and a more 
modest European large country average growth rate of 1.5%, then the 
Chinese economy will be larger than that of the five large European countries 
(UK, Italy, Spain, France and Germany), and by 2050, nearly twice as large as 
all five combined. 
It is a long way away, indeed as "far" away from today as the mid 1970 s, 
but by 2050 Europe's economic role in the world will have shrunk from a po-
sition of potential leadership to a relatively minor player, behind China, the 
US and India. Other emerging countries on Europe's borders will, if recent 
growth rates can be sustained, percolate towards the top of the national out-
put rankings, with Turkey and Russia leading the way here. 
As it rises, the emerging world is fast changing its appraisal of Europe. Take 
Turkey as an example. In the 1990s Turkey was enticed by the prospect of EU 
membership and successfully used the standards and frameworks set out as 
the terms of possible membership to advance its economy. Despite a relatively 
short-lived crisis in 2000-2001 Turkeys economy has thrived in the past 
twenty years, and its society, though perhaps not its public life has been more 
modern. While it was once a prize for Turkey to have the opportunity of join-
ing the Union, it would now be a prize for the Union to have Turkey in its 
fold. Turkey is now a model for the Arab Spring countries, for whom Europe 
has had little money and scant strategic advice. 
26. http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm 
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On a grander scale, the two large Asian nations, India and China27 now 
have a much more superior view of Europe, and the temptation is to feel that 
the Chinese man in the street regards Europeans as rich and lazy. China in 
particular looms as a strategic opportunity and threat. While currently a 
source of revenue growth to many European companies in the near future 
may provide them with their next shock as it transitions to more steady 
growth. In the longer term, China will gain more power at a geo-strategic 
level, in the governance of world institutions, in terms of its weight in finan-
cial markets and the activities of its sovereign wealth funds and, of course, its 
growing role the marginal factor in most commodities markets. It may also 
become a more taxing trade partner in terms of its search for innovation, re-
spect for intellectual property and the vexatious activities of Chinese internet 
hackers. To match this Europe needs a stronger, more coherent presence. 
So, the looming geo-strategic importance of many of Europe's former 
colonies will become increasing problematic from a strategic point of view 
and in simple terms underlines the need for a more cohesive political and e-
conomic structure. It also underlines the need for a faster and more nimble 
pace of growth in Europe. At a human level it emphasises the need for policy-
makers to internalise rather than pay lip-service to the need for growth, as a 
solution to the immediate debt crisis and as a competitive strategy vis-à-vis e-
merging economies. 
In the context of the Eurozone crisis, there are with the benefit of hind-
sight of course, several things that could have been done better from the point 
of view of stimulating growth. First, policy accidents such as the political s-
tatements at the Deauville summit that frightened liquidity out of the periph-
ery bond market have to be avoided. One suggestion is tighter marshalling by 
heavyweight "Sherpas" (who have banking backgrounds - not unlike the role 
played by Jean-Claude Trichet at the G7). 
A second suggestion is that the ECB should have been more responsive to 
the threats to the business cycle posed by the crisis and should have undertak-
en earlier, more aggressive monetary policy. The two long-term refinancing 
operations the Bank launched managed to break the Gordian knot tying bank 
financing and stressed government bond markets, but ultimately it may sim-
ply have created another feedback loop between, at least, the Spanish and 
Italian banks and their sovereign bond markets. In this respect, an independ-
27. K. Mahbubani, "The New Asian Hemisphere", Public Affairs, New York 2008. 
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ent overhaul of the mandate of the ECB is overdue, as is the composition of 
its governing council. This is intensely homogenous and lacks of broad expe-
rience28 outside the areas of technical economics (in either academia or cen-
tral banking). 
In many senses, the ECB has come through the crisis well, and is the exem-
plar of what a singular, coordinated pan-Eurozone body can achieve, especial-
ly when confronted with the spaghetti of inter-governmental, banking and 
policy making relationships. One area where it, and to a far greater extent the 
Commission, member state governments warrant far greater scrutiny is their 
failure to consider the necessity to allow individual banks to pass into bank-
ruptcy, to quickly recapitalise banks, and their reluctance to fully restructure 
the debt of individual governments. 
Such moves were apparently not undertaken because they could potentially 
lead to greater short-term market volatility (a la Lehman Brothers). These 
considerations must be balanced against the current situation economic and 
financial volatility continue to be a strain to much of Eurozone, where the 
trade-offs and possibilities for collateralisation that could have arisen from re-
structuring need to be considered in more detail. In addition, necessary debt 
restructurings (of banks and countries) would have leeched much of Europe's 
financial stress and importantly provided the moment from which the begin-
nings of a euro-bond market could be established. Necessary debt restructur-
ings would at this stage most likely have drawn private capital into periphery 
countries and banking systems and enabled a recovery. Instead banking sys-
tems in countries like Spain, Italy and parts of Germany are sclerotic and in 
many countries small and medium sized businesses are suffering. Structural 
funds should also be unleashed to support activity in countries suffering from 
economic shock. 
Ambitious infrastructure plans such as a Mediterranean Revival infrastruc-
ture project for the North and South of the Mediterranean could be led by 
the likes of the European Investment Bank, with qualified ECB backing given 
to bonds issued to finance infrastructure projects. Further, the EUR 120 bil-
lion growth package announced at the June EU Summit is a nod towards 
growth rather than a philosophical change of mind towards a more re-growth 
stance. 
28. Consider the depth of experience that individuals such as William McDonough 
brought to the US Federal Reserve system. 
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In summary, the remedy proposed here is different to the road taken by 
Europe's leaders. This essay proposes very severe treatment of countries that 
have failed to make the grade economically and institutionally, with an exit of 
one or more countries from the Eurozone a very likely event. In addition, 
policymakers must hasten towards the "truth" of Europe's indebtedness prob-
lem by undertaking multiple restructurings of government and bank debt. 
The effect of the two above measures will draw in private capital and likely 
permanently ease the stresses on the Eurozone financial system. In the imme-
diate future, punitive austerity measures must be eased, and growth-promot-
ing infrastructure projects must accompany on-going competiveness reforms. 
A greater, long-term project of rebuilding the financial institutions at the 
heart of the Eurozone is a next and very significant step, taking in the creation 
and staffing of a European Treasury a prominent suggestion. 
6. WHAT DOES EUROPE STAND FOR? 
If this were undertaken then it would market one of the great advances in 
modern financial and economic history. But it is not enough. The poor coor-
dination and sub-standard policy making and implementation seen in the fi-
nancial arena have their echo in other policy making quarters such as defence 
and energy. In this respect Europe needs a philosophical overhaul, from the 
bottom up and in a spirit that is very much the opposite of Valéry Giscard's 
lofty and drawn out stewardship of the EU Treaty. In fact, such an approach 
needs to produce a short statement of values and intent, recognisable by all 
Europeans. 
Europe needs to rediscover what it stands for, relative to its long and deep 
history and to a changing world. The philosophical topic of "progress", from 
a human as well as an economic point of view also deserves discussion because 
in many material senses "Europe" has peaked in that the vast majority of its c-
itizens are "secure" and enjoy a degree of liberty that is absent in many other 
parts of the world. Europe, in an economic, political and legal sense may find 
that it chooses to distinguish itself by the quality of its intangible infrastruc-
ture29 -facets such as the quality of education, research and development, 
29. "Intangible Infrastructure", Credit Suisse Research Institute, May 2009; see also M. 
O'Sullivan - R. Miller, What did we do right?, Blackhall Publishing, Dublin 2010. 
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healthcare, institutional quality and especially the rule of law. These are areas 
where many European countries lead the world, where there is a rich pedigree 
and where in the future Europe can distinguish itself competitively from at 
least the merging world. Some of these values are espoused in the 2020 
Lisbon Agenda though they are not grounded across a broad range of areas 
(e.g. culture, law) and are poorly communicated and implemented. If Europe 
had better institutions, strong intangible infrastructure, this crisis may never 
have happened. 
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